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the evidence in this case, is not, in fact, a dangerous weapon." 10
Other decisions in point1' are also at variance with our Louisiana
Supreme Court's decision in the Johnston case.
When the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that an unloaded
gun did not constitute a "dangerous weapon,"'12 the legislative
body of that state enacted a statute' which expressly stated that
an assault with a firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, would
constitute an aggravated assault. If it is socially desirable, be-
cause of the serious disturbance of the peace which may result,1
that the person who threatens another with an unloaded firearm
be held for an aggravated assault, then it is submitted that the
remedy should be by direct legislative action, rather than by a
judicial interpretation which involves an abandonment of the
general rule that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed
in favor of the accused.
J.M.S.
CRIMINAL LAW-SENTENCE-METHOD OF EXECUTION-The de-
fendant was tried and convicted of murder. On August 8, 1940,.
the judge sentenced him to death "by hanging by the neck until
dead." When the transcript of the proceedings was sent to the
Governor to have the date of execution fixed, the defendant, al-
leging that he could not be hanged because Article 569 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure had been repealed by Act 14 of
1940,1 and that the latter statute would be ex post facto if applied
10. Id. at 952.
11. Territory of Arizona v. Gomes, 14 Ariz. 139, 125 Pac. 702 (1912);
People v. Sylva, 143 Cal. 62, 76 Pac. 814 (1904); People v. Montgomery, 15
Cal. App. 315, 114 Pac. 792 (1911); State v. Godfrey, 17 Ore. 300, 20 Pac. 625
(1889). In State v. Napper, 6 Nev. 113 (1870), a threat with an unloaded
firearm was held not to constitute an assault under a statute defining an
assault to be "an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to com-
mit a violent injury upon the person of another."
12. Luitze v. State, 204 Wis. 78, 234 N.W. 382 (1931). In this case the
assailant pointed an unloaded revolver at another. The question of law to be
decided was whether this constituted an assault with a dangerous weapon.
The court held that this was not an assault with a dangerous weapon, no
matter how much the person at whom it was pointed may have been
put in fear.
13. Wis. Stats. (1935) § 340.40.
14. In view of the strain which was placed upon the context of the
controlling articles in the principal case, it may be safely inferred that the
court is of the opinion that serious disturbance of the peace is very likely to
result from such an assault. The writer concurs in this opinion. It is a not
too uncertain likelihood that a victim may suffer serious mental pain and
injury. And in cases where the victim has a weak heart, his life may be
endangered 'or his condition aggravated.
1. Dart's Code of Crim. Law and Proc. (1943) Artp. 569-570.
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to his crime, made application for a writ of injunction to restrain
the Governor from ordering his execution. Held, the act is not
ex post facto when applied retrospectively, because it only
changes the method of execution and does not affect any substan-
tial personal right. State ex rel. Pierre v. Jones, 200 La. 808, 9
So.(2d) 42 (1942).
In the infliction of the death penalty we may consider three
elements: the time, the place and the method of execution. The
time and the place are by law no part of the judgment,2 nor
are they essential elements of the sentence. Where the place was
changed after the sentence had been imposed, the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the act changing it did not operate as
a legislative pardon, even in the absence of a saving clause, and
it left the correction of the sentence to be made by the trial court.,
Summarizing ex post facto laws within the intendment of
the Constitution, in Calder v. Bull,4 Mr. Justice Chase said: "ex
post facto law is every law that changes the punishment, and
inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime
when committed."' If Justice Chase had used the disjunctive or,
it could easily be argued that a law is ex post facto when it
either ameliorates or increases the punishment of a crime com-
mitted before the law was passed; but, by using the conjunctive
and, he makes it clear that the law must increase the punishment
in order that it fall within the constitutional inhibition.,
We know, then, that punishment may be lessened, but it can-
not be increased, constitutionally, by a statute enacted after the
commission of the offense;7 and when the increasing statute does
not contain a saving clause, the defendant will be discharged on
the theory that he has been legislatively pardoned.8
The question then arises whether the changing of the method
of inflicting the death penalty from hanging to electrocution is an
increase or mitigation of punishment. Some courts may hesitate
2. Blackstone, Commentaries (Croley's ed. 1529) 404; McDowell v. Couch,
6 La. Ann. 365 (1851); State v. Oscar, 13 La. Ann. 297 (1858).
3. State v. Johnson, 144 La. 735, 81 So. 293 (1919).
4. 3 U.S. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798).
5. Accord: State v. Read, 52 La. Ann. 271, 26 So. 826 (1899).
6. McGuire v. State, 76 Miss. 504, 25 So. 495 (1898); Liebowitz v. Warden
of New York County Penitentiary, 174 N.Y. Supp. 823, 186 App. Div. 730
(1919).
7. Hicks v. State, 150 Ind. 293, 50 N.E. 27 (1897); Commonwealth v. Wy-
man, 66 Mass. 237 (1853); Commonwealth v. Mott, 38 Mass. 492 (1859); Mc-
Guire v. State, 76 Miss. 504, 25 So. 495 (1898).
8. State v. Hickman, 127 La. 442, 58 So. 680 (1910); State v. Guillory, 127
La. 951, 54 So. 297 (1911); State v. Jones, 127 La. 768, 53 So. 985 (1911); State
v. Hagen, 136 La. 868, 67 So. 949 (1915); State v, Thomas, 149 TA. 654, 89
So. 887 (1921).
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to elaborate on this,9 but the Governor of New York, impressed
with the serious objections to executions by hanging and hopeful
that means might be found for taking life in a less barbarous
manner, brought the subject to the attention of the legislature
in 1885. A commission appointed to that end reported in favor
of electrocution as the most humane and practical method. This
method was adopted by statute in 1888.10 As a result of this well
grounded belief that electrocution is less painful and more hu-
mane than hanging," the states of Louisiana,12 Alabama, 8 Flor-
ida, 4 Georgia, 15 Illinois,' Indiana,"' Kentucky,18 Nebraska, 9 Ohio,20
Tennessee 1 and Texas 22 have adopted legislation similar to that
of New York. The statutes under consideration do not change
the penalty-death-but only the mode of inflicting it. The pun-
ishment is not increased and some of the odious features incident
to the old methods are abated.
In view of the foregoing, the question above presented may
be answered by saying that a change from hanging to electro-
cution is a mitigation of the punishment; therefore even if the
statute effecting the change is passed after the commission of the
crime it would not come under the constitutional prohibition.
Furthermore, "the inhibition of the Constitution was intended
to secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppres-
sive legislative action, and not to obstruct mere alterations in
conditions deemed necessary for the orderly infliction of human
punishment; ' '21 and statutes of the nature of Act 14 of 194024 are
procedural-not substantive2 -and are not derogatory of any
right an accused had prior to the enactment.
9. Hartung v. People, 22 N.Y. 95 (Ct. App. 1860).
10. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 10 S.Ct. 930, 34 L.Ed. 519 (1890).
11. Storti v. Commonwealth, 178 Mass. 549, 60 N.E. 210 (1901); State v.
Tomassi, 75 N.J. Law 739, 69 AtI. 214 (1907).
12. La. Act 14 of 1940 [Dart's Code of Crim. Law and Proc. (1943) Arts.
569, 5701.
13. Ala. Code (1940) tit. 15, § 343.
14. Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws (Skillman, 1927) § 8429.
15. Ga. Code (1935) § 27-2512.
16. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1941) c. 38, § 749.
17. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 9-2236.
18. Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942) § 431.220.
19. Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929) § 29-2504.
20. Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 13456-2.
21. Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) § 11790.
22. Tex. Crim. Stat. (Vernon, 1936) § 798.
23. Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 35 S.Ct. 507, 59 L.Ed. 905 (1915).
24. Dart's Code of Crim. Law and Proc. (1943) Arts. 569, 570.
25. State v. Brown, 342 Mo. 53, 112 S.W. (2d) 568 (1938).
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In jurisdictions other than Louisiana, courts have reached
the same conclusion with reference to statutory change from
hanging to either electrocution 26 or lethal gas.2 7
In the Pierre case28 and the subsequent case of State v. Burks2 9
the judge sentenced the defendant to death by hanging and the
trial court amended the sentence to make it comply with the pro-
visions of Act 14 of 1940. In Henry v. Reid0 the sentence was to
die "in the manner provided by law" so that the executive head
of the government could order the execution according to the
statute then in force. This form of the sentence was also held
valid in a later case.3 1
We come to the conclusion that the method of carrying out
the death penalty is as unessential an element as are the time and
the place, and that it may be changed by the legislature even
after the accused has been found guilty or has been sentenced,
and its change at such a time does not deprive the defendant
of any of his substantial rights. Actually it works to his advan-
tage because thus the state is free to adopt the most modern and
humane method of inflicting capital punishment.
A.C.
NEGLIGENCE - DANGEROUS PREMISES - LICENSEE AND INVITEE
DISTINGUISHED--Plaintiff, a sixteen year old boy, entered the shop
office of defendant railroad company in search of the superin-
tendent. His purpose was to solicit defendant's advertising for a
local newspaper. While waiting outside the shop, he was injured
when one of several metal car wheels, which were negligently
stacked, fell upon him. Held, plaintiff was an invitee and as such
was owed the duty of reasonable care with respect to the condition
of the premises. The court, having found that the plaintiff was
entitled to protection against negligence, allowed recovery under
26. Woo Dak San v. State, 36 N.M. 53, 7 P. (2d) 940 (1931); Shipp v.
State, 130 Tenn. 491, 127 S.W. 317 (1914).
27. Hernandez v. State, 43 Ariz. 424, 32 P. (2d) 18 (1934); Shaugnessy v.
State, 43 Ariz. 445, 32 P.(2d) 337 (1937); State v.Brown, 342 Mo. 53, 112 S.W.
(2d) 568 (1938).
28. 200 La. 808, 9 So. (2d) 42 (1942), commented on in (1943) 5 LoUISNA
LAW REvIEw 259.
29. 202 La. 167, 11 So. (2d) 518 (1942), commented on in (1943) 5 LOUISANA
LAW REVIEW 578.
30. 201 La. 857, 10 So.(2d) 681 (1942), commented on in (1943) 5 LOt'SIANA
LAW REVImW 578.
31. Iles v. Flournoy, 202 La. 29, 11 So.(2d) 16 (1942).
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